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NOTE
The FMLA and Psychological Support: Courts Care
About “Care” (and Employers Should, Too)
Katherine Stallings Bailey*
The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) recognizes an employee’s right
to take leave to care for a qualifying family member. In light of the Act’s
remedial nature, the intended scope of the care provision is broad, but its
definitional details are sparse. As a result of the attendant interpretive discre-
tion afforded to courts, the Seventh Circuit announced its rejection of the re-
quirement—first articulated by the Ninth Circuit—that care provided during
travel be related to continuing medical treatment. A facial analysis of the re-
sulting circuit split fails to appreciate the fundamental difference between the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ considerations: the distinction between physical
and psychological care. Whereas physical care is readily measurable, psycho-
logical care is less defined and, consequently, ripe to facilitate FMLA abuse.
Efforts to combat this potential lead courts to impose judicially devised limita-
tions on psychological care, but judicial discretion still infuses some uncer-
tainty into proceedings. For employers, the best remedy lies in the FMLA’s
optional certification provision, which requires medical validation of an em-
ployee’s need for leave. In requiring certification, employers should distinguish
between physical and psychological care, maximize the FMLA’s informational
requirements, and implement complete and consistent request and approval
procedures.
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Introduction
“What happens here, stays here.” The official slogan of Las Vegas1
proved false for Beverly Ballard, whose trip there caused her to lose her full-
time employment with the City of Chicago.2 The twenty-five-year employee
of the Chicago Park District accompanied her terminally ill mother on a
charity-funded trip to Las Vegas.3 Prior to their departure, she submitted a
request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which
the Park District formally denied.4 Despite Ballard’s failure to receive ap-
proval, she still proceeded with the trip,5 expecting that her leave would be
retroactively authorized.6
As her mother’s primary caregiver, Ballard administered the necessary
medication and looked after her mother throughout the trip.7 However,
both primarily engaged in typical tourist activities: “[P]laying slots, shop-
ping on the Strip, people-watching, and dining at restaurants.”8 At no point
did Ballard or her mother intend to seek professional care during the trip—
the purpose was purely recreational.9 Shortly after Ballard’s return, the Park
District fired her for the unauthorized absences.10 Ballard subsequently filed
1. Samantha Shankman, A Brief History of ‘What Happens in Vegas Stays in Vegas’,
Week (Oct. 1, 2013), http://theweek.com/articles/459434/brief-history-what-happens-vegas-
stays-vegas [https://perma.cc/7VCT-Z3BL].
2. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 900 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d
838 (7th Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 806.
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suit against the Park District,11 alleging that it violated the FMLA by denying
her request for leave and then firing her.12
The FMLA permits employees to receive leave to care for a “spouse . . .
son, daughter, or parent” facing “a serious health condition.”13 Congress
intended for the FMLA to provide a work–life balance for employees,14 but
it did not expressly define the scope of care or specific means protected.15
Accordingly, judges retain discretion as to whether specific forms of care
qualify for protection, and the attendant assessment is consequently fact
intensive.16
The First and Ninth Circuits have cabined the FMLA’s care provision:
through a series of decisions from 1999 to 2011, they adopted the condition
that any care-related travel must be tied to the ill family member’s continu-
ing medical treatment.17 In Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that a mother’s relocation of her son for non-treatment
reasons did not constitute care,18 and, in Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., it dis-
missed a husband’s claims of care through automobile retrieval and phone
calls as nonsensical.19 In Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hospital, Inc., the First Circuit
invoked the Ninth Circuit’s rationale and determined that a wife who ac-
companied her ill husband on a faith-based healing trip had not provided
FMLA-protected care.20
Ballard’s trip to Las Vegas, however, prompted conflict: the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted a broader understanding of care, which it considered irrecon-
cilable with that of the First and Ninth Circuits.21 In Ballard v. Chicago Park
District, the court read the FMLA to protect physical care not tied to the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2012).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1); Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.101(a) (2016).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
16. See, e.g., Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014); Tayag v. Lahey
Clinic Hosp., Inc., 632 F.3d 788 (1st Cir. 2011); Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045
(9th Cir. 2005); Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 29
C.F.R. § 825.124(a) (providing a general framework for qualifying circumstances with a non-
exhaustive list of examples); Maegan Lindsey, Comment, The Family and Medical Leave Act:
Who Really Cares?, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 559, 560 (2009) (noting that “courts throughout the
country vary in their approaches to determine what constitutes caring for a family member”).
17. See Tayag, 632 F.3d 788; Tellis, 414 F.3d 1045; Marchisheck, 199 F.3d 1068.
18. 199 F.3d 1068. The court observed that “[t]he relevant administrative rule . . . sug-
gests that ‘caring for’ a child with a ‘serious health condition’ involves some level of participa-
tion in ongoing treatment of that condition.” Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1076.
19. 414 F.3d 1045. The court cited Marchisheck for the requirement that care “involve[ ]
some level of participation in ongoing treatment of [the family member’s serious health] con-
dition.” Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1076).
20. 632 F.3d at 791 n.2 (“The inclusion of ‘psychological comfort and reassurance’ in the
definition of care cannot extend to accompaniment of an ill spouse on lengthy trips unrelated
to medical care.” (citation omitted)).
21. See Ballard, 741 F.3d 838.
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continuation of current medical treatment.22 As a result, the basic medical
care in question, provided during travel unrelated to treatment, qualified as
“protected” under the FMLA.23 The Seventh Circuit explicitly differentiated
its decision from those of the First and Ninth Circuits, which both deter-
mined that care provided during travel needed to be tied to continuing med-
ical treatment.24
Despite the Ballard court’s recognition of a circuit split,25 its decision
may not be entirely at odds with Marchisheck and Tellis. While Ballard’s
analysis focused almost exclusively on physical care,26 the courts in
Marchisheck and Tellis were forced to consider what was primarily, if not
entirely, psychological care.27 This distinction is crucial—while physical care
is readily measurable, psychological care is more difficult to assess.28 Given
shared concerns about abuse of the FMLA’s provisions, the difference in
perceptibility explains the stricter locational requirement first articulated by
the Ninth Circuit with respect to psychological care. For the same reason,
courts throughout the country impose judicially created limitations on psy-
chological care, both with respect to nonmedical travel and general claims of
care under the FMLA.
For employers and their advisors alike, there exists a clear response:
make substantive use of the FMLA’s optional certification provision.
Through optional certifications, employers can require doctors to confirm
the necessity of FMLA leave requests prior to approval.29 With logic support-
ing judicial deference to medical professionals in an ambiguous area of as-
sessment,30 employers should use certification as an opportunity to solicit
and record, to the fullest extent allowed, potential bases for leave. To avoid
falling prey to unexpected outcomes during litigation, employers should
preemptively take the time to ensure that their own certification documents
distinguish between physical and psychological care, require the information
permitted by the FMLA for “sufficient” certification,31 and proactively en-
sure consistent compliance with application and approval procedures. The
administrative work on the front end will mitigate the inherent unpredict-
ability of any discretionary, fact-specific assessments during litigation.
Accordingly, this Note argues that employers should seize the opportu-
nity to exercise the optional certification provision as described. Part I con-
tends that attempts to interpret the FMLA’s broad scope of care contributed
22. Id. at 842.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 842 n.2.
26. Id. at 841. See infra Section II.A for a description of the court’s considerations.
27. See Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2005); Marchisheck v. San
Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1999).
28. See infra Part II for a discussion of the difference between these two types of care.
29. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2613 (2012).
30. See infra Section III.A.
31. See infra Section III.B.
May 2017] The FMLA and Psychological Support 1217
to a circuit split less deep than it may initially appear. Part II argues that the
split masks the material difference between physical and psychological care,
and it maintains that judicially imposed limitations on psychological care—
exercised across the nation—reflect a shared concern of potential FMLA
abuse. Part III argues that a general judicial deference to medical assess-
ments, while an administrable solution to concerns of abuse, may prove un-
predictable for employers forced to litigate FMLA claims. Therefore, it
advocates for employers to proactively use the FMLA’s optional certification
provision, coupled with consistent compliance procedures, to maximize
control over the inherent risks of litigation.
I. The Source: When Care Creates Conflict
The judicial discretion afforded by the flexibility of the FMLA fosters
apparent tension between circuits in interpreting the broadly defined scope
of “care.” In a large sense, the FMLA provides protection for employees
struggling to both maintain employment and tend to immediate family
needs.32 However, with respect to the care provision, its lack of definitional
boundaries33 permits judges to make case-by-case assessments of what con-
stitutes care, which causes friction when circuits perceive conflict between
approaches.34 In this vein, in Ballard, the Seventh Circuit interpreted its ap-
proach to care as divisive and the cause of a split with the First and Ninth
Circuits.35
This Part maintains that the FMLA’s broad definition of care afforded
the Ballard court the discretion to frame its analysis as conflicting with the
First and Ninth Circuits’ approach. Section I.A discusses the remedial nature
of the FMLA, the contours of its provisions and regulations regarding care,
and the attendant concerns regarding abuse. Section I.B describes the Bal-
lard court’s purported split from the First and Ninth Circuits’ approach to
the scope of care.
A. The FMLA: A Remedial Recognition of Employee Rights
The FMLA provides that, subject to potential certification requirements,
an employee has an annual entitlement to twelve weeks of leave to “care for
[a] spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent . . . if such spouse, son, daughter,
or parent has a serious health condition.”36 Passed in 1993,37 the FMLA was
32. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1); Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.101(a) (2016).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
34. See Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We respectfully
part ways with the First and Ninth Circuits . . . .”).
35. Id. at 842 n.2.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
37. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6.
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meant to “balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of fami-
lies”38 by affording employees time to “attend to pressing family health obli-
gations.”39 Congress recognized the modern tension between work and
family life, and it characterized the resulting burden on both employees and
employers—as well as families and society—as heavy.40 The rationale behind
the FMLA was rooted in the identified connection between family stability
and workplace productivity.41 By recognizing a right to unpaid leave for
qualifying family members’ medical care, Congress intended for the FMLA
to ameliorate the conflict between work and family obligations.42
The FMLA does not expressly define permissible forms of care,43 but
official interpretations provide guidance. The term “care” receives a broad
reading44 that includes both physical and psychological forms of assistance.45
This expansive interpretation recognizes the significant benefit of psycholog-
ical care provided by the close family members identified in the FMLA, as
opposed to that provided by caregivers with weaker or nonexistent familial
connections.46 As a result, employees may qualify for FMLA leave based on
the “serious health condition” of “[a] spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent,
of the employee.”47 Sufficient circumstances include those in which, “be-
cause of [the] serious health condition,” the family member is unable to
independently attend to “basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or
safety” or travel to a doctor.48 Permissible psychological care includes “com-
fort and reassurance which would be beneficial to a child, spouse or parent
with a serious health condition who is receiving inpatient or home care.”49
These examples are not exhaustive—other means of physical or psychologi-
cal care may still qualify for leave under the FMLA.50 In addition, employees
38. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1); Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.101(a) (2016).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101(c).
40. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 (“Private sector
practices and government policies have failed to adequately respond to recent economic and
social changes that have intensified the tensions between work and family. This failure contin-
ues to impose a heavy burden on families, employees, employers and the broader society. [The
bill] provides a sensible response to the growing conflict between work and family by estab-
lishing a right to unpaid family and medical leave for all workers covered under the act.”).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101(c).
42. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 4, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
44. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 24, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 26.
45. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a).
46. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 24, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 26.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a).
49. Id.
50. See id. (explaining that the enumerated situations were only examples of some of the
qualifying circumstances).
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are still entitled to FMLA leave when they fill in for usual caregivers or ad-
just arrangements for care, and the availability of other potential caregivers
is not dispositive.51
While the FMLA affords employees greater accommodations to attend
to familial obligations, its flexibility presents the opportunity for abuse of its
terms.52 To protect against potential instances of abuse, the FMLA includes a
provision by which employers can require advance certification of leave by a
medical professional.53 If requested, the certification must be issued by the
family member’s health care provider and provided to the employer “in a
timely manner.”54 In the case of doubt or conflicting opinions, employers
are also permitted to require second and third opinions at their own ex-
pense.55 Nevertheless, in the end, the right to twelve annual weeks of qualify-
ing leave remains with the employee.56
B. Care While Away and the Reason for Travel: Does It Matter?
The FMLA’s broad definition of “care” has created friction between ju-
dicial interpretations of its actual scope. In Marchisheck v. San Mateo
County, the Ninth Circuit read the Department of Labor (“DOL”) regula-
tions to “suggest[ ] that ‘caring for’ a child with a ‘serious health condition’
involves some level of participation in ongoing treatment of that condi-
tion.”57 Following an assault on her teenage son, who had been attending
psychological counseling, Marchisheck decided to relocate him to live with
family in the Philippines, based on “her fear for [his] safety.”58 After her
employer denied her request for leave, Marchisheck reached out to a psychi-
atrist—whom she had never met—to “kind of help [her] out because [she
was] having a hard time getting time off” for the relocation.59 The psychia-
trist issued a three-sentence letter in her support, but Marchisheck’s em-
ployer still denied her request for leave.60 Undeterred, Marchisheck
proceeded with the trip, and she was subsequently terminated.61 The court
51. Id. § 825.124(b).
52. See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 25–26 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 27–28
(recognizing the potential for employee abuse of the FMLA).
53. Id.
54. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (2012).
55. Id. § 2613(c)–(d).
56. Id. § 2612(a)(1).
57. 199 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
58. Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1071. Marchisheck “feared that if she left [her son] alone, he
would be beaten or killed, and she believed that he would be safe from ‘getting beaten up
again’ if he moved to her brother’s house in the Philippines.” Id.
59. Id. at 1071–72.
60. Id. at 1072. The doctor had no information about the son’s future treatment—which
Marchisheck had no plans to secure—and admitted “that he was not sure what he was refer-
ring to when he described a ‘family medical crisis’ and that he did not recall whether he
actually had drafted the letter himself.” Id.
61. Id.
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determined that Marchisheck failed to create a factual dispute as to whether
her son had a “serious health condition”—it recognized that, alone, this
would be sufficient to destroy her FMLA claim.62 Yet the court went further
and reiterated that Marchisheck had not provided FMLA-protected care
through the trip.63 It emphasized that she had no plans to arrange for medi-
cal care for her son, and there was no psychological treatment even available
within three hours of the son’s location.64 The court concluded that
Marchisheck “could not ‘care for’ [her son] under the FMLA by removing
him to a place where he would receive no treatment.”65
The Ninth Circuit doubled down on its logic in Tellis v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc.: it quoted Marchisheck to reiterate that “caring for a family member with
a serious health condition ‘involves some level of participation in ongoing
treatment of that condition.’ ”66 Tellis’s wife had been experiencing difficul-
ties with her late-stage pregnancy, which prompted Tellis to take leave with-
out officially securing approval.67 While Tellis was away, his car broke down,
and he took a flight across the country to retrieve the family’s secondary
vehicle.68 Tellis claimed that this trip provided his wife with “psychological
reassurance . . . that she would soon have reliable transportation,” and he
maintained that his calls to his wife over the course of the three-and-a-half-
day trip “provided moral support and psychological comfort.”69 As in
Marchisheck,70 the court relied on the DOL regulations for its inference of
the continuing-treatment requirement.71 Ultimately, it rejected Tellis’s
claims as beyond the scope of the FMLA’s care provision.72
In Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hospital, Inc., the First Circuit subsequently
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s rationale to suggest that, if an employee travels
to care for a family member pursuant to FMLA leave, the trip needs to be
related to medical treatment of the family member’s relevant condition.73
Tayag took unapproved leave to accompany her husband on a spiritual pil-
grimage abroad.74 Although she provided basic physical care on the trip,75
62. Id. at 1074–76.
63. Id. at 1076.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 414 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1076).
67. Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1046.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1046–47.
70. Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1076.
71. Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1047.
72. Id. at 1048.
73. 632 F.3d 788 (1st Cir. 2011).
74. Tayag, 632 F.3d at 790.
75. Id. (“Tayag assisted [her husband] by administering medications, helping him walk,
carrying his luggage, and being present in case his illnesses incapacitated him.”).
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the court only considered “whether a ‘healing pilgrimage’ comprise[d] med-
ical care within the meaning of the FMLA.”76 Tayag described the healing
pilgrimage as “aimed at treating the illness and providing psychological
comfort.”77 The court cited to the DOL regulations, Tellis, and Marchisheck
to reason that “[t]he inclusion of ‘psychological comfort and reassurance[ ]’
. . . in the definition of care cannot extend to accompaniment of an ill
spouse on lengthy trips unrelated to medical care.”78 The court ultimately
determined that Tayag’s trip did not constitute FMLA-protected care.79
In Ballard v. Chicago Park District, the Seventh Circuit announced its
split from the First and Ninth Circuits with respect to the scope of “care.”80
The Park District argued that the assistance Ballard provided did not fall
within the scope of the FMLA because she already provided consistent home
care to her mother, and the trip to Las Vegas was not “related to a continu-
ing course of medical treatment.”81 The Ballard court disagreed, holding that
assistance qualifies for leave independent of current medical treatment, as
long as an employee tends to a family member’s basic needs.82 The court
considered the location of care irrelevant—if attendance to basic needs at
home would qualify as care, then so too should the same assistance provided
away from home.83
The court concluded that this determination created a circuit split with
the approach of the First and Ninth Circuits.84 In its view, the Marchisheck,
Tellis, and Tayag courts’ use of the word “treatment” was more restrictive
than the statutory term—“care”—which included the provision of basic as-
sistance unrelated to medical treatment.85 Whereas the inference of an ongo-
ing-treatment requirement would cabin an employee’s travel to that which
related to the family member’s current medical treatment, the Ballard
court’s reading would permit any travel during which “basic” care was pro-
vided, making the destination and location of care irrelevant. This difference
in interpretation prompted the Ballard court’s recognition of a split.
II. The Split: What It Masks, and What It Reveals
Part II argues that the split caused by Ballard may be softened by the
recognition of the differences between physical and psychological care. The
Ballard court took care to note that it would “respectfully part ways” with
76. Id. at 791.
77. Id. at 792.
78. Id. at 791 n.2.
79. Id. at 793.
80. 741 F.3d 838, 842 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014).
81. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 840.
82. Id. at 842.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 842 n.2.
85. Id. at 842.
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the Marchisheck, Tellis, and Tayag courts,86 and it made explicit that its opin-
ion “create[d] a split between circuits.”87 Section II.A contends that, in real-
ity, the Marchisheck and Tellis courts faced different factual circumstances
with respect to the types of care provided,88 and the perceived disagreement
was inflated by different approaches to statutory interpretation. Section II.B
maintains that attempts to constrain potential FMLA abuse have resulted in
courts across the nation devising limitations on what qualifies as psychologi-
cal care. Such judicial initiative with respect to psychological care—which is
already amorphous—strengthens the need for employers to use the optional
certification provision to minimize unpredictability in litigation.
A. Statutory Interpretation: Distracting from the Facts
An analysis of the development behind Ballard’s split helps to demon-
strate the difference between judicial analyses of physical care—capable of
tangible measurement—and psychological care—a more amorphous con-
struct, susceptible to manipulation. The different approaches to statutory
interpretation represent a means of reaching a result that makes sense for the
facts of the case at hand: In Ballard, where the daughter provided measura-
ble physical care, the court determined that a textual reading of the care
provision did not imply a locational requirement.89 In Marchisheck90 and
Tellis,91 however, where the care was less easily identifiable, courts adopted a
functionalist approach to reach a result rooted in “[c]ommon sense.”92
Unlike the Ballard court, the Marchisheck and Tellis courts never faced
facts in which basic physical care was provided. Marchisheck contended that
the one-time relocation of her son to avoid physical abuse and psychological
pressures constituted sufficient care—nothing involved the provision of
86. Id.
87. Id. at 842 n.2.
88. For a discussion of the split with respect to the First Circuit’s decision in Tayag, see
infra notes 115–124 and accompanying text.
89. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 842–43.
90. Marchisheck alleged that her one-time relocation of her son to live with family in the
Philippines and remain “safe from further beatings” constituted care. See Marchisheck v. San
Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of why this is best
considered psychological care, see infra note 93.
91. Tellis claimed that his cross-country trip to retrieve the family’s automobile and calls
to his pregnant wife constituted care. Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th
Cir. 2005).
92. Id. at 1048.
May 2017] The FMLA and Psychological Support 1223
physical, day-to-day assistance.93 The court dismissed Marchisheck’s individ-
ual instance of assistance as outside the bounds of the care provision.94 Simi-
larly, in Tellis, the court assessed the care provision solely with respect to
psychological care. Tellingly, the Tellis court rationalized its continuing-
treatment requirement by reference to another judicial limitation regularly
imposed on psychological care.95 Indeed, every case on which the Tellis court
relied in describing this “instructive” requirement involved primarily—if
not solely—psychological care.96 Tellis alleged that his retrieval of the family
automobile provided “psychological reassurance” to his wife and that his
phone calls to his wife provided “moral support and comfort.”97 The court
rejected Tellis’s interpretation of the FMLA on the basis of a “[c]ommon
sense” notion of the care provision’s scope.98
In Ballard, the court assessed the care provision with a sole focus on
day-to-day physical assistance. Ballard acted as her mother’s “primary
caregiver” and provided care that ranged from meal preparation to basic
medical treatment.99 When she accompanied her mother on the trip to Las
Vegas, Ballard continued to provide the same physical care that she did at
home; the only material change was in location.100 While the court initially
observed that the issue presented would involve questions of “physical and
psychological care,” the only aspect of Ballard’s care that the court assessed
was the physical care she provided.101 The court discussed the mother’s “ba-
sic medical, hygienic, and nutritional needs,” and, with respect to the rele-
vant DOL regulations, it sought guidance for physical care, not
93. Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1076. While Marchisheck did not explicitly characterize the
care she provided as “psychological,” at least one other commentator has done so. See Kelsey
A. Jonas, Note, Fixing the FMLA’s Flaws: A Fight for Care, Adult Children, and Tax Incentives,
118 W. Va. L. Rev. 1313, 1338 (2016) (“[B]oth the majority of the son’s ailments and the
mother’s support were psychologically-based. The son did not need medications administered
nor his food prepared; he was capable of providing his own basic care.” (footnote omitted)).
In deciding whether to characterize Marchisheck’s alleged care as physical or psychological, it
is important to note that, on the trip, the son required no physical care, and Marchisheck had
no plans to arrange for later medical treatment. Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1076. She sought to
assuage her own fear for his safety, id. at 1071—in this sense, the nature of the alleged care
appears to be best characterized as psychological.
94. Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1076.
95. Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1047 (“Courts in this Circuit and other jurisdictions that have
concluded a particular activity has constituted ‘caring for’ a family member under the FMLA
have done so only when the employee has been in close and continuing proximity to the ill
family member.”). See infra Section II.B.2 for a discussion of this particular requirement.
96. See Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1047 (first citing Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d
1078, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2002)); then citing Brunelle v. Cytec Plastics, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 67,
77 & n.13 (D. Me. 2002); then citing Briones v. Genuine Parts Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 711,
715–16 (E.D. La. 2002); and then citing Pang v. Beverly Hosp., Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643,
648–49 (Ct. App. 2000)).
97. Id. at 1048.
98. Id.
99. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838, 839 (7th Cir. 2014).
100. Id. at 839–40.
101. See id. at 839, 841–42.
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psychological care.102 It determined that, “at the very least, Ballard requested
leave in order to provide physical care,” which it reasoned was “enough to
satisfy [the FMLA’s requirements].”103 Thus, by the court’s own admission,
the pertinent care in Ballard was physical, not psychological.
The Ballard court relied on statutory interpretation to emphasize its dis-
agreement with the Marchisheck, Tellis, and Tayag courts.104 It adopted a for-
malist, text-based approach to the interpretation of “care” under the FMLA.
The court began its analysis by observing that the relevant texts impose no
express geographic limit on physical care.105 Its assessment also included the
significance of specific word selection106 and the conflicting results that
emerge with other terms in the statute under a narrow approach to “care.”107
The court concluded that nothing in the text prohibits basic assistance away
from home that is not part of the ill relative’s current medical care.108 It
observed that, of the three cases from the First and Ninth Circuits, “[t]he
only one . . . that purports to ground its conclusion in the text of the statute
or regulations is Marchisheck.”109 However, it then explained that the conclu-
sion reached in Marchisheck did not actually follow from any text.110
The Marchisheck and Tellis courts took a more functionalist, effects-
based approach to the scope of “care.” The Marchisheck court recited the
DOL regulations, considered the facts of the case, and simply concluded that
“[t]he relevant administrative rule . . . suggests that ‘caring for’ a child with
a ‘serious health condition’ involves some level of participation in ongoing
treatment of that condition.”111 In Tellis, the court relied on “[c]ommon
sense” with respect to the range of acts covered under the care provision.112
The courts rationalized the scope of “care” without engaging in the same in-
depth, textual analysis undertaken by the Ballard court. As a result, the Bal-
lard court concluded that its textual approach provided the correct reading
of the scope of the care provision.
Despite the Ballard court’s discussion of statutory interpretation and
ultimate split, it still recognized that the DOL regulations regarding care
could suggest a locational requirement for psychological care.113 Rather than
102. Id. at 841–42. The court conceded that the DOL regulations may contain a locational
requirement, but summarily dismissed it as “only concern[ing] psychological care.” Id. at 841.
103. Id. at 842.
104. Id. at 840–43.
105. Id. at 840–41 (considering the text of the statute and the relevant DOL regulations).
106. Id. at 840 (noting that the legislature chose to use “care” instead of “treatment”).
107. Id. at 842 (observing that “serious health condition” expressly rejects active treat-
ment as a prerequisite for its qualifications).
108. Id. at 842–43.
109. Id. at 842.
110. Id. at 842–43.
111. Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
112. Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005).
113. Ballard, 741 F.3d at 841. The court explained:
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addressing the issue, the court simply determined that the physical care Bal-
lard provided was sufficient to satisfy the FMLA’s requirements and then
proceeded with its analysis. Tellingly, following Ballard, in Gienapp v. Harbor
Crest, the Seventh Circuit directly referenced the amorphous nature of psy-
chological care.114
It is worth noting that, in Tayag, the court faced circumstances that
included both physical and psychological care115—the same combination in-
itially described, albeit not ultimately considered, in Ballard.116 Notably,
however, the Tayag court limited its consideration to “whether a ‘healing
pilgrimage’ comprises medical care within the meaning of the FMLA,” ex-
plicitly disregarding the basic physical care that Tayag provided during the
trip.117 In its analysis, the Tayag court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s continu-
ing-treatment requirement, which—despite its foundation solely in consid-
erations of psychological care—did not expressly identify any limitation in
its application regarding the type of care.118 As a result, the Tayag court sug-
gested that physical care provided on a nonmedical trip would not be pro-
tected by the FMLA,119 which contributed to the Ballard court’s recognition
of a split. Also worth noting, however, are the unique circumstances in
Tayag: Tayag had already used the FMLA’s care provision to provide tradi-
tional medical care to her husband, but she then attempted to advance a
constitutional argument alleging religious discrimination against the “relig-
iously affiliated healing program[ ] . . . aimed at treating the illness and
The only part of the regulations suggesting that the location of care might make a differ-
ence is the statement that psychological care “includes providing psychological comfort
and reassurance to [a family member] . . . who is receiving inpatient or home care.” 29
C.F.R. § 825.116(a) (2008) (emphasis added). Even so, as the district court correctly ob-
served, this example of what constitutes psychological care does not purport to be exclu-
sive. Moreover, this example only concerns psychological care. The examples of what
constitutes physical care use no location-specific language whatsoever.
Id. (alteration in original).
114. See Gienapp v. Harbor Crest, 756 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that “some
forms of familial assistance are too tangential to hold out a prospect of psychological benefits
to a covered relative”).
115. Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hosp. Inc., 632 F.3d 788, 790 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that Tayag
“administer[ed] medications, help[ed] [her husband] walk, carr[ied] his luggage, and [was]
present in case his illnesses incapacitated him”).
116. See Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839, 842 (“[A]t the very least, Ballard requested leave in order
to provide physical care. That, in turn, is enough to satisfy [the FMLA’s requirements].”).
117. Tayag, 632 F.3d at 791. The court seemed to suggest that, had Tayag only provided
the basic care on a trip similar to that in Ballard, it would not have been sufficient. Id. (“Tayag
properly does not claim that caring for her husband would itself be protected leave under the
FMLA if the seven-week trip was for reasons unrelated to medical treatment of [her hus-
band’s] illnesses.”).
118. See, e.g., Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e
have previously stated that caring for a family member with a serious health condition ‘in-
volves some level of participation in ongoing treatment of that condition.’ ” (quoting
Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th. Cir. 1999))).
119. Tayag, 632 F.3d at 791.
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providing psychological comfort”—an argument the court denounced as
“hardly a serious treatment of a complex issue.”120 The length of her leave
was extremely atypical, the initial medical certification she obtained was
questionable, and the second medical certification—requested by her em-
ployer—“disavowed the need for any leave.”121 Tayag had also previously
used vacation time for what appeared to be a similar pilgrimage-type trip
without attempting to claim FMLA leave.122 It is plausible that the combina-
tion of these factors may have heightened the court’s sensitivity to potential
FMLA abuse, although this proposition is speculative.
Tayag illustrates that the judicial discretion afforded by the FMLA leads
courts to inevitably deviate, to some degree, in their approaches to the scope
of care. While it is crucial for employers to anticipate and plan for potential
deviations, it is also prudent to look for common threads within the discord.
One relative constant across courts is the concern regarding abuse when
employees claim more amorphous, harder-to-measure forms of care.123
Physical care does not implicate this concern as readily because, by its na-
ture, it can be measured. Psychological care, however, is where this concern
abounds, given the difficulty of identification and measurement. This poten-
tial for abuse, in turn, prompts the inference of additional requirements.124
B. Opposition to Abuse: The Common Approach to FMLA Interpretation
1. Efforts to Constrain Psychological Care Provided
During Nonmedical Travel
A wider lens for Ballard’s comparative framework should reveal to em-
ployers that a number of circuits are motivated by the same concerns regard-
ing the care provision—primarily, the potential for abuse of the FMLA. This
consistency supports the possibility that, had the circuits explicitly consid-
ered the differences between physical and psychological care, their results
may have appeared less discordant. Indeed, Ballard explicitly noted the po-
tential for abuse, even though it did not directly address whether Ballard’s
trip constituted abuse.125 The Tayag court also alluded to the potential for
abuse with Tayag’s faith-healing trip. The court highlighted the fact that
120. Id. at 791–92.
121. Id. at 792–93.
122. Id. at 790 (“In May 2006, without claiming FMLA leave, Tayag used vacation time to
travel with [her husband] to Lourdes, France—a major site for Roman Catholic pilgrimage
and reputed miraculous healings.”).
123. See infra Section II.B.
124. Some courts purport to adopt a “loose” standard for psychological care. E.g., Fioto v.
Manhattan Woods Golf Enters., 270 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 123 F. App’x
26 (2d Cir. 2005). However, a loose standard in terms of the acts considered does not bar
back-end restrictions: courts can still—and do—impose certain conditions that psychological
care must meet to satisfy the FMLA’s requirements. See infra Section II.B. The requirements
discussed in Section II.B serve to cabin the potentially expansive scope of psychological care
through judicial construction.
125. Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Tayag had already taken full advantage of the FMLA for her husband’s ordi-
nary medical treatment, yet still tried to loop in an additional faith-healing
trip as care.126 It also discussed the difference in medical certifications and
concluded that, “[s]ince nothing in [the initial] certificate provided a basis
for a seven-week leave and the [second certificate] had disavowed the need
for any leave, [Tayag’s employer] was justified in denying FMLA leave.”127 In
Tellis, the court suggested the same potential for abuse—it reiterated that
Tellis “left” his wife “for almost four days,” and it dismissed Tellis’ purported
care as contrary to “[c]ommon sense.”128
Courts across the country echo these same concerns. In Alsoofi v.
Thysennkrupp Materials NA, Inc., a district court determined that a son’s
alleged provision of psychological comfort to his mother from afar was
nothing more than a “collateral benefit” of non-FMLA care.129 It concluded
that, if the FMLA did not support travel with the family member for non-
medical reasons, travel without the family member would almost certainly
fall short of protected care.130 Similarly, in Isaacowitz v. Dialysis Clinic Inc., a
district court concluded that an employee could not claim FMLA protection
to accompany his ill mother on a cruise.131 The court made a concerted
distinction between care “incidental” to a leave request and care essential to
a leave request.132 It determined that, when the main purpose of the leave is
vacation, the time off is not protected by the FMLA.133
126. Tayag, 632 F.3d at 790–91.
127. Id. at 793. In discussing the questionable validity of the first certification, which
Tayag procured, the court explained:
[T]he requested seven-week leave was different from the brief leaves taken by Tayag over
the previous four years and suggested by earlier certifications. When [her husband’s doc-
tor] provided a new certificate in August 2006, he included “coronary artery disease” for
the first time as a listed condition, but said only that [her husband’s] incapacity would
occur “intermittently” and for his “lifetime” and provided no explanation as to why a
seven-week leave would be needed.
Id. at 792.
128. Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005).
129. No. 09-CV-12869, 2010 WL 973456, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2010). Alsoofi
claimed that, by stepping in to accompany his younger sister to a wedding abroad, he provided
psychological comfort to his mother. Alsoofi, 2010 WL 973456, at *4. In its analysis, the court
took care to note that Alsoofi was, “almost literally, half a world away from his mother” and
that he did not stay in constant contact. Id. at *5.
130. Id. at *6.
131. No. CIV-09-638 JCH/RHS, 2010 WL 8913513 (D.N.M. Feb. 22, 2010). Isaacowitz’s
mother was diagnosed with “wet macular degeneration,” and Isaacowitz explained that the
cruise “may be the last time [his mother] will get to enjoy scenery with her family with her
eyesight.” Isaacowitz, 2010 WL 8913513, at *1–2. He also told his employer that the cruise,
organized and sponsored by a Jewish synagogue, was “a religious outing.” Id. at *2.
132. Id. at *6.
133. Id. The court focused on its understanding of the FMLA’s purpose, which it found
did not include “a means for allowing an employee who lacks the necessary vacation time to
take time of [sic] from work without permission.” Id. It then reiterated that “going on a
cruise” was not integral to the mother’s medical care. Id.
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2. General Efforts to Constrain the Concept of Psychological Care
Courts struggle to reconcile the intended interpretation of the FMLA134
with their desire to prevent abuse of its terms. For this reason, concerns
regarding general abuse also take shape in FMLA-related contexts apart from
the issue of care provided during nonmedical travel. The similar restrictions
different courts have constructed to constrain potential abuse—often impli-
cated with the amorphous nature of psychological care—illustrate their un-
derlying concerns and objectives regarding the FMLA.
One judicially enforced limitation imposed upon FMLA leave requires
that the employee provide actual care as opposed to just visiting an ill rela-
tive. In Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Enterprises LLC, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that, because Fioto could not provide evidence suggesting that he
planned to provide actual care or identifiable support during the visit, the
visit did not rise to the requisite level of care under the FMLA.135 Similarly,
in Overley v. Covenant Transport, Inc., the Sixth Circuit determined that a
mother’s visit to her daughter’s assisted-living home did not constitute
FMLA-protected care.136 The court gave weight to the “routine” nature of
the visit, which involved Overley merely checking up on her daughter.137 In
the absence of identifiable care provided, courts often dismiss visits as
outside of the scope of the care provision.138
An additional restriction used by courts requires the employee to be in
close physical proximity to the ill relative. In Tellis, the court explicitly relied
upon the “close and continuing proximity” requirement for FMLA-pro-
tected care.139 Similarly, in Baham v. McLane Foodservice, Inc., the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that Baham’s telephone conversations with his ill daughter and
134. See supra Section I.A (explaining that the scope of the FMLA’s care provision is
expansive).
135. 123 F. App’x 26, 28 (2d Cir. 2005).
136. 178 F. App’x 488, 495 (6th Cir. 2006).
137. Overley, 178 F. App’x at 495.
138. See, e.g., Taylor v. Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage, Inc., No. 4:08CV02833, 2010 WL
892075 SWW (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8, 2010); Brehmer v. Xcel Energy, Inc., No. 06-3294 (JNE/JJG),
2008 WL 3166265 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2008), aff’d, 356 F. App’x 890 (8th Cir. 2009); Schoon-
over v. ADM Corn Processing, No. 06-CV-133-LRR, 2008 WL 282343 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 31,
2008); Roff v. Low Surgical & Med. Supply, Inc., No. CV-03-3655(SJF)(JMA), 2004 WL
5544995 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2004).
139. Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). The Tellis court
observed that “[c]ourts in this Circuit and other jurisdictions that have concluded a particular
activity has constituted ‘caring for’ a family member under the FMLA have done so only when
the employee has been in close and continuing proximity to the ill family member.” Id. Nota-
bly, every case on which the Tellis court subsequently relied involved primarily—if not
solely—psychological care. Id. (first citing Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078,
1087–88 (9th Cir. 2002); then citing Brunelle v. Cytec Plastics, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 67, 77 &
n.13 (D. Me. 2002); then citing Briones v. Genuine Parts Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 711, 715–16
(E.D. La. 2002); and then citing Pang v. Beverly Hosp., Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 648–49 (Ct.
App. 2000)).
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provision of out-of-state chores did not qualify as care under the FMLA.140
The Eighth Circuit used the same approach in Miller v. State of Nebraska
Department of Economic Development to find that Miller could not have pro-
vided psychological care to his ill father while traveling with a companion.141
Courts have repeatedly recognized that, to qualify for FMLA protection, psy-
chological care cannot be provided from afar.142
A final constraint used to contain concerns of abuse requires immediacy
in the care provided by the employee. The DOL regulations describe family
medical needs under the FMLA as “pressing family health obligations.”143 In
Overley, the court explained that “[t]he FMLA does not provide leave for
every family emergency,”144 and it repeatedly recognized that Overley’s care
did not need to occur at the time she performed it—Overley admitted that
the meetings she attended were not time sensitive.145 The court also focused
on the routine nature of the care, emphasizing the fact that none of the
provisions carried a special sense of immediacy.146 Likewise, in Lane v. Pon-
tiac Osteopathic Hospital, the district court determined that a son’s leave to
handle flooding in his ill mother’s home did not qualify as protected care
under the FMLA.147 The court reasoned that flooding did not impact the
mother’s illness, so Lane did not have an immediate, pressing need for leave
related to his mother’s medical care.148
No statutory provision compels restrictions of these sorts149—rather,
they are judicially devised limitations on the ability to qualify for FMLA
leave. The imposition of additional restrictions on the scope of psychological
care may appear inconsistent with the expansive understanding intended by
140. 431 F. App’x 345, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1047). The court
noted that it could not find any authority “holding that merely remaining in frequent tele-
phone contact with a relative while in another state” falls under FMLA-protected care. Baham,
431 F. App’x at 349.
141. 467 F. App’x 536, 541 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1047).
142. See Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1047 (first citing Scamihorn, 282 F.3d at 1087–88; then citing
Brunelle, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 77 & n.13; then citing Briones, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 715–16; and then
citing Pang, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648–49) (“Courts in this Circuit and other jurisdictions that
have concluded a particular activity has constituted ‘caring for’ a family member under the
FMLA have done so only when the employee has been in close and continuing proximity to
the ill family member.”); see also Alsoofi v. Thysennkrupp Materials NA, Inc., No. 09-CV-
12869, 2010 WL 973456, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2010).
143. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.101(c) (2016) (ex-
plaining the purpose of the FMLA).
144. Overley v. Covenant Transp., Inc., 178 F. App’x 488, 494 (6th Cir. 2006).
145. Id. at 495.
146. Id.
147. No. 09-12634, 2010 WL 2558215 (E.D. Mich. June 21, 2010).
148. Lane, 2010 WL 2558215, at *4–5 (citing Overley, 178 F. App’x at 494–95).
149. See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012).
1230 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:1213
Congress, but they are a necessity for the judges forced to consistently adju-
dicate the fact-specific FMLA claims brought before them.150 Like the func-
tionalist approach of the Marchisheck and Tellis courts,151 judicially imposed
restrictions help to manage the amorphous nature of psychological care,
which is inherently ripe for abuse because of the difficulty in its identifica-
tion and analysis. This undercurrent of common concern regarding abuse
signals a basic agreement between the courts with respect to the interpreta-
tion of the FMLA required in practice. The dichotomy between a “broad”
understanding of care152 and judicially created requirements for qualifica-
tion153 suggests an intuitive conclusion: courts want to recognize legitimate
needs for leave, but do not want to compromise the integrity of the FMLA
by indulging manipulative requests. The problem is rooted in the nature of
the care provided: while day-to-day physical care is readily identifiable, psy-
chological care is more amorphous, and thus implicates heightened levels of
concern regarding the potential for abuse. The solution to alleviating these
judicial concerns must emerge from a method by which to distinguish legiti-
mate psychological care from abuses disguised in the dressings of care.
III. The Solution: Certification and Consistency
Part III argues that the most effective way to curb abuse is to defer to
medical expertise through evenhanded use of the FMLA’s optional certifica-
tion provision.154 Section III.A explains that, due to the intangible and
amorphous nature of psychological treatment, some courts already defer to
the judgment of doctors. Section III.B contends that, for employers, this
existing—and advisable—judicial reliance on medical expertise should com-
pel the use of the FMLA’s optional certification provision. Section III.C
maintains that employers should follow three steps in crafting a certification
strategy: (1) specifically identifying psychological care on certification
forms;155 (2) confirming that forms ask for the informational requirements
permitted under FMLA provisions; and (3) monitoring requests, certifica-
tions, and approvals for compliance and consistent enforcement.
150. See supra Part I.
151. See supra Section II.A.
152. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 24 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 26.
153. See supra Part I.
154. Other commentators have taken more reform-oriented approaches. See, e.g., Jonas,
supra note 93, at 1334–36 (proposing drafting solutions that include analogies to the Internal
Revenue Code and a two-pronged regulatory definition of care); Lindsey, supra note 16, at
584–89 (suggesting revisions to the current DOL regulations); Margaret Wright, Comment, A
Caring Definition of “Care”: Why Courts Should Interpret the FMLA to Cover Unconventional
Treatment of Seriously Ill Family Members, 32 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 35 (2015) (advocating a
three-part test for judicial assessments of “unconventional” care). This Note does not delve
into reform; rather, it attempts to advise employers as to the most effective practices under the
current FMLA regime.
155. But see infra note 174.
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A. Deference to Doctors: The Problems Posed by Psychological Care
While the outcome of each FMLA case involving “care” proves highly
fact dependent, the judiciary’s shared struggle in assessing psychological care
suggests that the key to distinguishing legitimate psychological care from
potential FMLA abuse comes from medical doctors, not judges and lawyers,
or employers and employees. Psychological care is inherently difficult to
measure.156 A daughter cannot prove the comfort of her presence in the
same way that she can point to the physical assistance she provides—the
administration of a tangible medication is more readily identified than is the
intangible benefit of a bedside companion. In this way, psychological care is
subject to a greater likelihood for abuse, and courts are less equipped to
recognize and remedy these manipulations by employees.157 As a result,
courts attempt to cabin psychological care generally by imposing various—
but not universal—limitations on permissible forms of care.158
This risk is compounded where the family member’s serious health con-
dition is a matter of mental health.159 In Scamihorn v. General Truck Drivers,
the Ninth Circuit found that, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Scamihorn, he had provided his father with psychological care
sufficient to meet the requirements of the FMLA.160 The majority deter-
mined that Scamihorn’s relocation to Reno, daily conversations with his fa-
ther, and constant presence represented “participation in [the] ongoing
treatment of [his father’s] condition” in the form of psychological care.161 It
also took care to reiterate that the medical opinions provided urged the le-
gitimacy of Scamihorn’s psychological care.162 The dissent disagreed: in its
view, the fact that Scamihorn’s father retained his employment and tended
156. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Lessons from the Ludicrous: How Employment Laws Are De-
stroying the American Workplace, 2 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 129, 135 (1997) (book review) (noting
that psychological ailments are difficult to see or measure).
157. See Robin Stryker et al., Employment Discrimination Law and Industrial Psychology:
Social Science as Social Authority and the Co-Production of Law and Science, 37 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 777, 782 (2012) (noting the tension that arises between the judicial system’s need to
find “particulars hiding among the universals” and social science’s pursuit of “universals hid-
ing among the particulars” (quoting David L. Faigman, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Mis-
use of Science in the Law 69 (1999)).
158. See supra Section II.B.
159. See Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078, 1087–88 (9th. Cir. 2002); see
also Stepp v. Castrucci of Alexandria, LLC, No. 10-146-WOB-CJS, 2011 WL 7046018 (E.D. Ky.
Dec. 19, 2011), adopted by No. 10-146-WOB-CJS, 2012 WL 124809 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 17, 2012). In
Stepp, a Kentucky district court deferred to a medical opinion from a non-psychiatrist to
support its conclusion that a father’s FMLA claim regarding psychological care for his daugh-
ter was not frivolous. Id. at *2 & n.6, *5.
160. 282 F.3d at 1087–88 (reviewing Scamihorn’s appeal of the motion granting summary
judgment to his employer).
161. Scamihorn, 282 F.3d at 1087–88.
162. See id. at 1088. The court confirmed that two psychiatrists who had seen the father
“emphasized [the] fact” that Scamihorn provided psychological care through his therapeutic
conversations and constant presence. Id. at 1088.
1232 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:1213
to his own basic needs negated any pressing need for possible psychological
comfort from Scamihorn.163 The dissent flagged signals of potential FMLA
abuse by contrasting Scamihorn’s depiction of his father as “needy” with the
reality in which the father, “an obviously active man,” “[was] perfectly capa-
ble of caring for himself and [did] so.”164
Examples of dependence on medical validation suggest a means of logi-
cal recourse for courts seeking to supplement their own assessments of psy-
chological care. However, as indicated by the dissent in Scamihorn, not all
medical opinions are equally persuasive.165 Doctors differ, as do the exacting
nature and credibility of their individual questioning and assessments of pa-
tients, which leaves employers with some degree—though reducible—of in-
herent unpredictability.
B. Certification: The Affirmative Responsibility to Ask
The difference in quality and depth of medical opinions—combined
with the varying weight they may receive from different courts—illustrates
the importance of employers retaining as much front-end control as possible
through comprehensive certification procedures. The optional certification
provisions available under the FMLA166 provide a means for employers to
preemptively curb and, where necessary, control litigation. The Ballard
court, among others, explicitly recommended the certification approach to
address concerns of potential abuse of the care provision.167 The certification
provisions permit an employer to require that the health care provider of the
employee’s ill family member provide support for the employee’s request for
leave.168
The risks posed to employers by failing to require certification are sub-
stantial. The DOL regulations instruct that, in the absence of a certification
requirement, “verbal notice” may be sufficient to inform an employer of
leave taken pursuant to the FMLA.169 In addition, for employees seeking
leave under the FMLA for the first time, they “need not expressly assert
163. Id. at 1089 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. See id. The dissenting judge ignored the proffered medical assessment in favor of a
judicial analysis of validity. Id. (“[I]t [is not] to say that Scamihorn’s father did not derive
some comfort . . . from his son . . . . But it is to say that I find it highly doubtful that Congress
passed the FMLA for the purpose of forcing employers to accommodate workers who desire to
care for a relative who is perfectly capable of caring for himself and is doing so. . . . To say that
Scamihorn’s father was unable to care for himself would not only insult an obviously active
man, but also would twist the FMLA almost beyond recognition.” (footnotes omitted)).
166. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 2613 (2012).
167. See, e.g., Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2014); see also S. Rep.
No. 103-3, at 25–26 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 27–28 (noting that the certi-
fication provision is “a check against employee abuse of leave [to care for a family member
with a serious health condition]”); infra note 170.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 2613.
169. See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) (2016)
(“An employee shall provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that
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rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA.”170 These requirements
constitute a low default administrative threshold: if, in discussing leave, an
employee mentions FMLA-qualifying needs to a supervisor—without refer-
ence to the FMLA itself—it may be enough to trigger obligations on the
employer’s behalf.171 In such cases, employers would necessarily leave deter-
minations of sufficiency to case-by-case assessments by individual supervi-
sors—a dangerous game to play when considering legal liability, particularly
for larger employers. A certification requirement shifts the effective burden,
however: once an employer requires certification, “[the] employee has an
obligation to respond to [the] employer’s questions designed to determine
whether an absence is potentially FMLA-qualifying.”172 If an employee fails
to complete the required certification, the employer may be entitled to deny
leave if the legitimacy of the request is in question.173
When an employee alleges a violation of the FMLA, the claim will nec-
essarily be a fact-intensive assessment for the court, making the proceeding
more unpredictable for employers. If that claim then involves an assessment
of psychological care, the court’s judgment will require even more discre-
tion, both with respect to its own assessment and the amount of deference it
affords any medical opinion. To mitigate the ultimate unpredictability, em-
ployers should consider the following steps:
(1) Tailor certification forms to account for the difference between physi-
cal and psychological care;174
(2) Confirm that forms solicit the informational requirements permitted
under the FMLA certification provisions; and
the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the
leave.”).
170. Id. (emphasis added); see also Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370, 381 (8th Cir.
2000) (“An employee need not invoke the FMLA by name in order to put an employer on
notice that the Act may have relevance to the employee’s absence from work.”). The Thorson
court explained that, “[u]nder the FMLA, the employer’s duties are triggered when the em-
ployee provides enough information to put the employer on notice that the employee may be
in need of FMLA leave.” 205 F.3d at 381 (quoting Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d
1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 1999)). The court reiterated the employer’s failure to “resort to the pro-
tections for employers provided by the FMLA to address just this sort of situation.” Id. at 381
(describing the FMLA’s optional certification provision).
171. See Thorson, 205 F.3d at 381; 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c).
172. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c).
173. Id. The DOL regulations explain:
An employee has an obligation to respond to an employer’s questions designed to deter-
mine whether an absence is potentially FMLA-qualifying. Failure to respond to reasona-
ble employer inquiries regarding the leave request may result in denial of FMLA
protection if the employer is unable to determine whether the leave is FMLA-qualifying.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. This Note does not recommend excessive modification of the sample forms provided
by the U.S. Department of Labor. The sample forms are written to comply with the FMLA’s
requirements. A heavy-handed or “creative” approach to modifying certification forms may
venture too far afield and risk landing employers in trouble down the line.
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(3) Monitor the request and approval process for compliance and to en-
sure consistent enforcement.
1. Formal Distinction Between Physical and Psychological Care
Employers should require that certification forms differentiate between
the anticipated psychological and physical care through the use of separate
sections.175 The DOL provides a default FMLA certification form for use by
employers.176 With respect to necessary care, the form requires only the pro-
jected duration of the family member’s capacity, dates for potential follow-
up treatments, and whether the follow-up might warrant additional care.177
Its sole request for any open-ended elaboration of the necessary care asks
that the health care provider “[e]xplain the care needed by the patient and
why such care is medically necessary.”178 The only reference to psychological
care appears in the instructions, which remind the provider to consider “as-
sistance with basic medical, hygienic, nutritional, safety or transportation
needs, or the provision of physical or psychological care.”179
While an employer cannot require medical facts beyond those permitted
by FMLA regulations,180 the provider is entitled to disclose details as specific
as information regarding the family member’s symptoms and diagnosis.181
The regulations appear to permit the creation of separate questions for po-
tential physical care and potential psychological care,182 which would force
health care providers completing the forms to explicitly identify and address
the possibility of psychological care.
2. Inclusion of the Informational Requirements Permitted by the FMLA
Employers should take care to—within the bounds dictated by the
FMLA—solicit as much information as they require to make adequately in-
formed decisions regarding leave requests. If required by an employer, the
175. But see supra note 174 for caution regarding modification of the DOL’s sample
forms.
176. Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Form WH-380-F, Certification of
Health Care Provider for Family Member’s Serious Health Condition (Family and
Medical Leave Act) (2015), https://www.dol.gov/whd/forms/wh-380-f.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E6QD-XWWE].
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1.
181. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.306(a)(3) (2016).
182. For examples of forms that use this distinction, see Cal. Dep’t of Human Res.,
Certification of Health Care Provider for Family Member’s Serious Health Condi-
tion (2016), http://www.calhr.ca.gov/Documents/calhr-755.pdf [http://perma.cc/W7CH-
Z5TC]; Or. Health Auth., Or. Dep’t of Human Servs., Health Care Provider Certifi-
cation: Family and Medical Leave 1 (2011), http://apps.state.or.us/Forms/Served/
de0113.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z8CP-3V96].
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provider’s request for leave will generally be “sufficient” under the FMLA if
it includes the following:
(1) the date on which the serious health condition commenced;
(2) the probable duration of the condition;
(3) the appropriate medical facts within the knowledge of the health care
provider regarding the condition;
(4) . . . a statement that the eligible employee is needed to care for the son,
daughter, spouse, or parent and an estimate of the amount of time that
such employee is needed to care for the son, daughter, spouse, or
parent.183
The potential informational requirements listed in the certification provi-
sion provide a specific solution to courts’ perceived difficulties in identifying
and measuring psychological care. The provision gives deference to those
medical experts who are best informed regarding the patient and who can
best assess whether psychological care is actually warranted and legitimate—
in this sense, the onus rests properly and proactively on medical experts. On
its face, this option for employers appears to directly combat the concerns of
opportunistic abuse that drive the FMLA decisions of many circuits.184
Although the certification provision contains an explicit enumeration of
the qualifications for sufficiency, the actual language softens its rigidity and
allows doctors leeway in the specific details they must provide. The provi-
sion only states the information that will prove sufficient to qualify for
leave—it does not affirmatively require any of that information.185 Instead,
the burden rests on employers to include requirements for such information
in their respective FMLA forms.186 In addition, while the term “probable”
and the phrase “within the knowledge of the health care provider” are pre-
sumably necessary to accommodate the predictive nature of medical fore-
casts, they also loosen the qualification standard for the provided
information. To ensure that doctors provide information sufficient to in-
form decisions regarding leave, an employer should ensure that its certifica-
tion form at least incorporates the questions posed in the standard form
provided by the DOL.187
183. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b) (2012).
184. See supra Section II.B.
185. See Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #28G: Certification of
a Serious Health Condition Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (2013) [herein-
after DOL Factsheet #28G], http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28g.pdf [http://
perma.cc/4DQC-93ML] (listing the content that a certification form may include).
186. See, e.g., Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 836 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
FMLA “allows” employers to require medical facts on certification forms, but noting the “sali-
ent point” that AT&T chose not to require the information it later sought).
187. Employers must take care, however, to not solicit information beyond that permitted
under the specific FMLA regulations. See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29
C.F.R. § 825.306(a) (2016) (listing information that an employer may require of a health care
provider). As noted, the greater the departure from the language of the sample forms, the
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3. Complete and Consistent Request and Approval Procedures
Employers should ensure that the employees conducting the request and
approval procedures are trained properly and follow employers’ prescribed
procedures for handling requests. Uniformity in administration is crucial to
guarding against liability for claims of interference.188 While the employer
must conduct its own procedures consistently, it must also make sure that
the employees requesting leave are complicit with the necessary require-
ments.189 To that end, employers should make sure that forms are complete
enough to confirm a statutorily sufficient basis for leave.
Employers should also use the FMLA’s second-opinion provision, which
allows an employer to solicit a second opinion issued by a health care pro-
vider of its own choice.190 Courts may simply defer to provided medical
opinions,191 and employees are entitled to select their issuing health care
providers.192 Allowing an employee to choose the issuing provider can result
in issues with doctors who are not experts in the medical field in question.193
Despite the employer’s obligation to pay the attendant costs,194 obtaining a
second opinion also provides an affirmative signal to courts that the em-
ployer did not acquiesce to the initial medical opinion.195
The certification provisions provide only a tool by which employers can
combat FMLA abuse. While an employer cannot require a higher standard
greater the potential risk of noncompliance faced. With respect to concerns regarding psycho-
logical care, the best course of action may be to simply use the sample certification forms with
the minor adjustment suggested in Section III.B.1.
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this
subchapter.”).
189. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c) (2016). The regulations instruct:
The employer shall advise an employee whenever the employer finds a certification in-
complete or insufficient, and shall state in writing what additional information is neces-
sary to make the certification complete and sufficient. . . . The employer must provide the
employee with seven calendar days (unless not practicable under the particular circum-
stances despite the employee’s diligent good faith efforts) to cure any such deficiency.
Id.
190. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(1). But see id. § 2613(c)(2) (prohibiting the use of a health care
provider “employed on a regular basis by the employer”).
191. See supra Section III.A.
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (identifying the issuing health care provider as that “of the
[seriously ill family member]”).
193. See, e.g., Stepp v. Castrucci of Alexandria, LLC, No. 10-146-WOB-CJS, 2011 WL
7046018, at *2 & n.6, *5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011) (deferring to an oncologist for a psychologi-
cal assessment), adopted by No. 10-146-WOB-CJS, 2012 WL 124809 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 17, 2012).
194. See DOL Factsheet #28G, supra note 185, at 2 (explaining that employers must pay
for the cost of the opinion and the employee’s reasonable travel expenses in procuring the
opinion).
195. See Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 386 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that, while an em-
ployer’s failure to seek a second opinion would not technically preclude a subsequent challenge
to the validity of a certification, in practice, there may still be “potential pitfalls for an em-
ployer who chooses not to pursue a second opinion”).
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than that prescribed by the certification provisions,196 the employer should
require as much information as the provisions permit for sufficiency, in-
cluding the designation of separate sections for psychological and physical
care. This type of specificity requires that employers make detailed assess-
ments of the exact information their FMLA forms request and confirm em-
ployees’ compliance with the informational requests upon submission of the
forms. In addition, employers must confirm that supervisory and adminis-
trative employees handle requests and certifications evenhandedly.
Employers should use the opportunity afforded by the FMLA’s optional
certification provisions to limit and control potential litigation. An alleged
violation of the FMLA will require a judge to assess the provision of care
with a case-specific approach to the facts. When the analysis involves psy-
chological care, the amorphous nature of such care will compel additional
discretion with respect to its validity. To limit the inevitability of unpredict-
able results, employers should tailor certification forms to distinguish be-
tween physical care and psychological care, solicit information to the extent
permitted by the FMLA, and ensure that processes for requests and approval
operate consistently.
Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit’s split in Ballard created the conflict necessary to
flag the significant difference between physical and psychological care under
the FMLA. While courts grapple with a variety of means by which to assess
psychological care, they share universal concerns regarding the potential
abuse that the amorphous nature of such care permits. To combat opportu-
nistic abuse, courts often—and appropriately—defer to the expertise of
medical professionals. Accordingly, employers should exercise the FMLA’s
optional certification provisions to their fullest extent by tailoring forms to
specifically account for psychological care, maximizing the FMLA’s permis-
sible informational requirements, and monitoring leave procedures to en-
sure consistent and complete compliance and enforcement. A
comprehensive certification approach will provide the best control against
unpredictability in future litigation.
196. See DOL Factsheet #28G, supra note 185, at 2.
